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ABSTRACT 
 
DIVESTMENT OF STATE-OWNED SHARES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
:THE CASE OF VIETNAM 
 
By 
 
SUNGMIN HONG 
 
In Vietnam, the privatization of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) through equitization has been 
in progress since 1992. Despite such efforts, state-owned shares remain high in most of the 
equitized SOEs. Thus, the national government of Vietnam started to pursue the divestment of 
state ownership in equitized SOEs for the purpose of genuine privatization. This paper focuses 
on identifying the effect of divestment of state ownership on the performance of enterprises. 
For a more detailed analysis, performance is classified into profitability and financial stability.  
This research reviewed the ownership structure change of 740 listed companies in Vietnam 
from 2001 to 2017, and  chose 58 companies that experienced significant divestment of state-
owned shares for sample. I calculated the relative performance of selected firms to the market 
average for both pre- and post-divestment periods. Comparison of the data from these two 
phases showed that divestment in state-owned shares does not contribute the statistically 
significant improvement on the performance of enterprises. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Under Đổi Mới policy for economic reforms, Vietnam has pursued the restructuring of state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) for more than 30 years. This reform is still in the progress, and 
privatization has been a key word of the restructuring policy. Privatization has been achieved 
in the form of “equitization”, and which differs from general privatization programs in other 
countries in terms of ownership structure after equitization. 
In the past 30 years since the start of this initiative, a large number of Vietnamese SOEs have 
been successfully equitized. However, state entities still hold a majority share of a number of 
equitized SOEs. In 2016, the Vietnamese government announced that it aimed to equitize 137 
SOEs which are undergoing the process of the reform until 2020 (Government of Vietnam, 
2016), showing a sign of accelerated equitization and divestment of SOEs. Add to this, the 
Vietnamese government approved the divestment of SOEs from 2017 to 2020 (Government of 
Vietnam, 2017). This move showed willingness of divestment. 
At this perspective, this paper looks into the Vietnamese economy and the history of 
equitization in the country. Also, the study reviews existing studies on privatization, ownership 
structure, and performance, and finally examines whether significant divestment of state-
owned share in enterprises improve the performance of listed enterprises. 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
VIETNAMESE ECONOMY 
The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Vietnam has been steadily increasing since 1985. Table 
2 
1 shows that the Vietnamese GDP was at USD 14,095 million in 1985, and it reached up to 
USD 223,864 million in 2017. Its GDP has increased nearly sixteen-fold for last 32 years, 
showing a Compound Average Growth Rate of (CAGR) 9.03%. The GDP per capita has also 
been growing. During the same period, it rose by more than 10 times with 7.51% of CAGR, 
and reached USD 2,343 in 2017. In 1986, under the Đổi Mới policy, several economic reforms 
were implemented that boosted rapid economic growth. The country had recorded a steep GDP 
growth, nonetheless, in 1977, due to the Asian Financial Crisis, growth rate significantly 
declined reaching 1.4% of economic growth rate. After the crisis, the Vietnamese economy 
had steadily recovered until the Great Recession in 2008. However, in overall, Vietnamese 
economy has showed steadily and strong GDP growth since 1985. 
Figure 1. GDP and GDP per capital of Vietnam (1985 - 2017) 
 
Source: World Bank National Accounts Data, and OECD National Accounts Data 
 
 
 
3 
EQUITIZATION IN VIETNAM 
Equitization process in Vietnam is classified into four stages. The first stage, the pilot phase,  
began in 1992 wherein five SOEs were equitized. The next phase – called the extended pilot 
phase -ran for a period of 1996 to 1998 where 25 SOEs had been equitized. The equitization 
process then started to accelerate since 1998, and the period 1998 to 2011 is called the 
accelerated phase. In this accelerated phase, total of 3,946 SOEs were equitized. The last stage, 
called the restructuring phase, began in 2011. 
Table 1. Phase of equitization and number of equitized SOEs 
 
Phase Time Number of Equitized SOEs 
Pilot phase 1992-1996 5 
Extended pilot phase 1996-1998 25 
Accelerated phase 1998-2011 3,946 
Economic Restructuring phase 2011-2015 508 
 
Source: Le (2017) 
 
In 2011, the Vietnamese government announced the transformation of SOEs with 100% state 
capital into joint stock companies (Government of Vietnam, 2011). It clearly classified the 
category of SOEs under reform program (Government of Vietnam, 2016), and finally approved 
a list of SOEs to be divested (Government of Vietnam, 2017). 
As the Vietnamese government pursued steady equitization, the number of SOEs significantly 
decreased. According to the Statistical Yearbook of Vietnam (2006, 2011, 2015, 2016), the 
number of SOEs has been declining as described in Table 2. In 2000, there were 5,759 SOEs 
out of the total 42,288 enterprises. This meant that the state owned 13.62% of enterprises in 
Vietnam. The number of SOEs and the ratio of SOEs to the total number of enterprises have 
been decreasing and by 2015, 2,835 enterprises were owned by the state, which accounted for 
0.64% of total enterprises.  
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The number of employees in SOEs has also been declining. In 2000, 2,083 thousand people 
worked in SOEs, and this accounted for nearly 59.0% of the total of employees. However, this 
number decreased steadily, and by 2015 only1,372 thousand people worked in SOEs which 
represented about 10.7% of the total of employees. Moreover, the annual average capital has 
also been changing throughout the years. As presented in Table 3, VND 670 trillion over VND 
998 trillion were in SOEs. However, these number changed drastically. In 2015, only VND 
6,945 in trillion out of VND 22,144 trillion were in SOEs. The ratio of capital in SOEs over 
total also has halved, changing from 67.1% in 2000 to 31.4% in 2015.
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Table 2. Number of Enterprises by type 
 
# of Enterprises 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
State owned enterprise 5,759  5,355  5,363  4,845  4,596  4,086  3,706  3,494  
Central 2,067  1,997  2,052  1,898  1,967  1,825  1,744  1,719  
Local 3,692  3,358  3,311  2,947  2,629  2,261  1,962  1,775  
Non-State enterprise 35,004  44,314  55,237  64,526  84,003  105,167  123,392  147,316  
Collective 3,237  3,646  4,104  4,150  5,349  6,334  6,219  6,689  
Private 20,548  22,777  24,794  25,653  29,980  34,646  37,323  40,468  
Collective name 4  5  24  18  21  37  31  53  
Limited Co. 10,458  16,291  23,485  30,164  40,918  52,505  63,658  77,647  
JSC. with State capital 305  470  558  669  815  1,096  1,360  1,597  
JSC. w/o State capital 452  1,125  2,272  3,872  6,920  10,549  14,801  20,862  
Foreign investment 
enterprise 1,525  2,011  2,308  2,641  3,156  3,697  4,220  4,961  
100% foreign capital 854  1,294  1,561  1,869  2,335  2,852  3,342  4,018  
Joint venture 671  717  747  772  821  845  878  943  
Total 42,288  51,680  62,908  72,012  91,755  112,950  131,318  155,771  
State owned enterprise 13.62% 10.36% 8.53% 6.73% 5.01% 3.62% 2.82% 2.24% 
Central 4.89% 3.86% 3.26% 2.64% 2.14% 1.62% 1.33% 1.10% 
Local 8.73% 6.50% 5.26% 4.09% 2.87% 2.00% 1.49% 1.14% 
 
# of Enterprises 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  
State owned enterprise 3,328  3,364  3,281  3,265  3,239  3,199  3,048  2,835  
Central 1,669  1,805  1,779  1,798  1,792  1,790  1,703  1,547  
Local 1,659  1,559  1,502  1,467  1,447  1,409  1,345  1,288  
Non-State enterprise 196,778  238,932  268,831  312,416  334,562  359,794  388,232  427,710  
Collective 13,532  12,249  -  -  -  -  -  -  
Private 46,530  47,839  48,007  48,913  48,159  49,203  49,222  47,741  
Collective name 67  69  79  179  312  502  507  591  
Limited Co. 103,091  134,407  163,978  193,281  211,069  230,640  254,952  287,786  
JSC. with State 
capital 1,812  1,740  1,710  1,751  1,761  1,614  1,536  1,416  
JSC. w/o State capital 31,746  42,628  55,057  68,292  73,261  77,835  82,015  90,176  
Foreign investment 
enterprise 5,626  6,546  7,248  9,010  8,976  10,220  11,046  11,940  
100% foreign capital 4,612  5,412  5,989  7,516  7,523  8,632  9,383  10,238  
Joint venture 1,014  1,134  1,259  1,494  1,453  1,588  1,663  1,702  
Total 205,732  248,842  279,360  324,691  346,777  373,213  402,326  442,485  
State owned enterprise 1.62% 1.35% 1.17% 1.01% 0.93% 0.86% 0.76% 0.64% 
Central 0.81% 0.73% 0.64% 0.55% 0.52% 0.48% 0.42% 0.35% 
Local 0.81% 0.63% 0.54% 0.45% 0.42% 0.38% 0.33% 0.29% 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2006, 2011, 2015, and 2016) 
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Table 3. Number of employees by type of enterprises 
 
Thousand 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
State owned enterprise 2,089  2,114  2,260  2,265  2,250  2,038  1,900  1,763  
Central 1,301  1,351  1,444  1,464  1,517  1,432  1,373  1,299  
Local 787  763  815  801  733  605  527  464  
Non-State enterprise 1,041  1,330  1,707  2,050  2,475  2,979  3,370  3,933  
Collective 182  152  160  161  158  160  149  149  
Private 236  278  340  378  432  481  499  513  
Collective name 0  0  0  1  0  0  0  1  
Limited Co. 517  698  923  1,143  1,394  1,595  1,740  1,940  
JSC. with State capital 62  114  144  161  184  281  367  435  
JSC. w/o State capital 44  88  140  206  307  462  614  895  
Foreign investment enterprise 408  489  691  860  1,045  1,221  1,445  1,686  
100% foreign capital 286  364  536  688  865  1,028  1,237  1,459  
Joint venture 122  125  155  173  180  192  208  227  
Total 3,537  3,933  4,658  5,175  5,770  6,237  6,715  7,382  
State owned enterprise 59.0% 53.8% 48.5% 43.8% 39.0% 32.7% 28.3% 23.9% 
Central 36.8% 34.4% 31.0% 28.3% 26.3% 23.0% 20.5% 17.6% 
Local 22.3% 19.4% 17.5% 15.5% 12.7% 9.7% 7.8% 6.3% 
 
Thousand 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  
State owned enterprise 1,725  1,736  1,692  1,664  1,606  1,660  1,538  1,372  
Central 1,303  1,341  1,305  1,309  1,192  1,274  1,181  1,006  
Local 423  394  387  356  415  386  356  365  
Non-State enterprise 4,691  5,266  5,983  6,681  6,759  6,855  7,148  7,713  
Collective 270  261  -  -  -  -  -  -  
Private 566  572  631  556  543  503  483  470  
Collective name 1  1  1  2  3  4  4  5  
Limited Co. 2,218  2,534  3,087  3,367  3,439  3,534  3,765  4,104  
JSC. with State capital 500  482  506  501  475  434  405  354  
JSC. w/o State capital 1,136  1,416  1,759  2,256  2,298  2,380  2,492  2,780  
Foreign investment enterprise 1,829  1,920  2,156  2,551  2,720  3,051  3,449  3,773  
100% foreign capital 1,604  1,691  1,902  2,289  2,476  2,783  3,163  3,470  
Joint venture 225  229  254  262  244  268  286  303  
Total 8,246  8,922  9,831  10,896  11,085  11,566  12,135  12,857  
State owned enterprise 20.9% 19.5% 17.2% 0.51% 14.5% 14.4% 12.7% 10.7% 
Central 15.8% 15.0% 13.3% 0.40% 10.7% 11.0% 9.7% 7.8% 
Local 5.1% 4.4% 3.9% 0.11% 3.7% 3.3% 2.9% 2.8% 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2006, 2011, 2015, and 2016) 
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Table 4. Annual Average capital by type 
 
VND in Trillion 2000  2001  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006  2007  
State owned enterprise 670  782  859  933  1,128  1,445  1,742  1,939  
Central 578  680  734  798  968  1,261  1,541  1,718  
Local 92  102  125  135  160  184  201  221  
Non-State enterprise 98  142  202  290  423  699  984  1,443  
Collective 8  8  9  11  13  17  19  23  
Private 16  21  27  34  43  72  88  105  
Collective name -  0  0  1  0  0  0  0  
Limited Co. 44  65  100  139  205  315  405  518  
JSC. with State capital 10  27  39  56  77  125  192  289  
JSC. w/o State capital 20  20  27  47  85  170  279  508  
Foreign investment enterprise 230  262  291  345  415  528  655  759  
100% foreign capital 84  107  132  161  218  307  405  488  
Joint venture 146  155  159  184  197  221  251  271  
Total 998  1,186  1,352  1,567  1,966  2,672  3,382  4,140  
State owned enterprise 67.1% 65.9% 63.5% 59.5% 57.4% 54.1% 51.5% 46.8% 
Central 57.9% 57.3% 54.3% 50.9% 49.3% 47.2% 45.6% 41.5% 
Local 9.2% 8.6% 9.2% 8.6% 8.1% 6.9% 6.0% 5.3% 
 
VND in Trillion 2008  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  
State owned enterprise 2,743  3,002  3,702  4,569  4,947  5,793  6,251  6,945  
Central 2,453  2,733  3,398  4,181  4,503  5,324  5,757  5,681  
Local 290  269  304  387  444  469  493  1,264  
Non-State enterprise 2,396  3,549  5,452  6,875  7,712  8,628  9,614  11,021  
Collective 41  49  -  -  -  -  -  -  
Private 149  189  324  206  297  304  316  402  
Collective name 0  0  1  1  1  1  3  3  
Limited Co. 797  1,250  2,085  1,911  2,652  3,038  3,608  4,828  
JSC. with State capital 471  568  813  1,173  1,025  1,031  962  834  
JSC. w/o State capital 938  1,493  2,230  3,585  3,736  4,254  4,726  4,953  
Foreign investment enterprise 994  1,222  1,688  2,179  2,570  3,343  3,813  4,178  
100% foreign capital 669  848  1,050  1,604  1,928  2,478  2,939  3,384  
Joint venture 325  374  637  575  642  865  873  794  
Total 6,133  8,994  10,841  13,623  15,228  17,764  19,677  22,144  
State owned enterprise 44.7% 33.4% 34.1% 1.41% 32.5% 32.6% 31.8% 31.4% 
Central 40.0% 30.4% 31.3% 1.29% 29.6% 30.0% 29.3% 25.7% 
Local 4.7% 3.0% 2.8% 0.12% 2.9% 2.6% 2.5% 5.7% 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2006, 2011, 2015, and 2016) 
  
8 
Table 5. Profit before taxes of enterprises by type of enterprises 
 
VND in Billion 2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  
State owned enterprise 115,193  144,881  170,669  201,603  185,116  157,065  
Central 90,526  122,378  143,660  174,880  157,603  121,621  
Local 24,667  22,503  27,009  26,723  27,513  35,444  
Non-State enterprise 115,654  84,218  68,236  78,726  122,522  150,528  
Private 2,931  2,994  3,497  3,329  3,612  4,558  
Collective name 53  115  7  103  85  139  
Limited Co. 27,534  4,681  11,739  6,871  25,843  27,808  
JSC. with State capital 34,164  34,581  26,961  27,897  29,873  33,688  
JSC. w/o State capital 50,972  41,847  26,032  40,526  63,109  84,335  
Foreign investment enterprise 165,454  105,309  120,032  207,943  249,057  245,154  
100% foreign capital 80,832  65,886  70,653  139,748  150,512  170,640  
Joint venture 84,622  39,423  49,379  68,195  98,545  74,514  
Total 396,301  334,408  358,937  488,272  556,695  552,747  
State owned enterprise 29.07% 43.32% 47.55% 41.29% 33.25% 28.42% 
Central 22.84% 36.60% 40.02% 35.82% 28.31% 22.00% 
Local 6.22% 6.73% 7.52% 5.47% 4.94% 6.41% 
Non-State enterprise 29.18% 25.18% 19.01% 16.12% 22.01% 27.23% 
Private 0.74% 0.90% 0.97% 0.68% 0.65% 0.82% 
Collective name 0.01% 0.03% 0.00% 0.02% 0.02% 0.03% 
Limited Co. 6.95% 1.40% 3.27% 1.41% 4.64% 5.03% 
JSC. with State capital 8.62% 10.34% 7.51% 5.71% 5.37% 6.09% 
JSC. w/o State capital 12.86% 12.51% 7.25% 8.30% 11.34% 15.26% 
Foreign investment enterprise 41.75% 31.49% 33.44% 42.59% 44.74% 44.35% 
100% foreign capital 20.40% 19.70% 19.68% 28.62% 27.04% 30.87% 
Joint venture 21.35% 11.79% 13.76% 13.97% 17.70% 13.48% 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2006, 2011, 2015, and 2016)  
  
In 2010, the total profit before taxes of enterprises was at VND 396,301 billion. Profit before 
taxes from SOEs hit VND 115,193 billion, accounting for 29.07% of the total profit. In the 
same year, non-state enterprises made up 29.18% of the total, and foreign-invested enterprises 
comprised 41.75%. In 2011, profit before taxes from SOEs then surged up to VND 170,669 
billion or 47.55% of total profit before taxes. It increased again two years later and reached 
VND 201,603 billion before it started to decline. In 2015, profit before tax of SOEs recorded 
VND 157,065 billion which accounted for 28.42% of the total profit before taxes. In the same 
year, profit before taxes of foreign investment enterprises was at VND 245,154 billion or 
9 
44.35%, accounting for the largest share of the total foreign investment. Meanwhile, non-state 
enterprises took less share of the total profit before taxes, about 27.23%. 
 
Table 6. Profit rate of enterprises by type of enterprises 
 
Percentage 2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015  
State owned enterprise 5.31% 5.18% 5.59% 6.50% 6.04% 5.57% 
Central 5.10% 5.38% 5.58% 6.59% 6.06% 5.10% 
Local 6.28% 4.29% 5.66% 5.98% 5.90% 8.12% 
Non-State enterprise 2.71% 1.48% 1.15% 1.25% 1.72% 1.84% 
Private 0.74% 0.61% 0.74% 0.67% 0.68% 0.88% 
Collective name 12.90% 27.25% 1.01% 9.35% 8.40% 7.10% 
Limited Co. 1.46% 0.18% 0.41% 0.22% 0.72% 0.67% 
JSC. with State capital 7.55% 5.08% 4.53% 5.54% 5.95% 6.91% 
JSC. w/o State capital 3.31% 2.15% 1.26% 1.85% 2.52% 2.79% 
Foreign investment enterprise 8.84% 5.06% 4.85% 6.70% 6.95% 5.80% 
100% foreign capital 4.22% 4.34% 3.70% 5.65% 5.16% 4.79% 
Joint venture 18.77% 7.00% 8.73% 10.82% 14.82% 11.22% 
Average 4.53% 3.16% 3.13% 3.91% 4.04% 3.63% 
Source: General Statistics Office of Vietnam (2006, 2011, 2015, and 2016) 
 
 
The profit rate of SOEs has been higher than that of non-state enterprises and average of total 
enterprises. In 2010, the average profit rate of SOEs was 5.31% which was higher than non-
sate enterprises’ rate and lower than that of foreign invested enterprises which recorded 8.84%. 
SOEs maintained a profit rate above five percent during the given period. Unlike SOEs, non-
state enterprises recorded relatively lower profit rate which spanned from 1.15% to 2.71% from 
2010 to 2015. Foreign investment enterprises showed the highest profit rate in the three 
categories. The profit rate of foreign investment enterprises lay from 4.85% to 8.84%, with an 
average of 6.63% which is higher than the average of SOEs, 5.80. Especially, a joint-venture 
form of foreign invested enterprises had an outstanding profit rate, arranged from 8.73% to 
18.77%.  
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1.2 OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY 
Privatization of SOEs has been going in the form of equitization since 1992, and a huge number 
of SOEs have been successfully equitized. However, the nature of equitization is not a complete 
privatization. Instead, it is closer to partial privatization wherein majority of the stake remains 
at state-owned shares even after equitization. State entities still hold large shares of equitized 
SOEs, thus equitization in Vietnam is not considered a complete privatization. To achieve 
genuine privatization which means reducing the influence of state entities to improve operating 
efficiency, the Vietnamese government began to pursue divestment of the state-owned shares.  
Thus, to identify the effect of the divestment efforts, I examined whether the divestment of 
state-owned shares has substantially benefitted the enterprises. 
 
1.3 DEVELOPMENT OF THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
In this paper, the research question focuses on the relationship between the divestment of state-
owned shares in enterprises and their performance. Thus, to analyze the impact of privatization 
through substantive divestment of state-owned shares, the main research question is:  
Does the divestment of government’s shares in SOEs improve the performance of SOEs? 
 
In addition, performance of firms is classified into two categories, the profitability, and the 
financial stability. Thus, I seek to respond the following detailed research questions: 
Does the divestment of state-owned shares improve the profitability and the financial stability 
of enterprises? 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Privatization and stock market liquidity 
According to Bortolotti, De Jong, Nicodano, and Schindele (2007), privatization has an impact 
on the stock market liquidity.  Privatization has impact on the liquidity of the shares of 
privatized companies, and also has a spillover effect on the price of other non-privatized stocks 
as well (Bortolotti et al, 2007). From the investors' perspective, privatization provides new 
stocks to invest, and improves the chance of risk sharing. If a stock is cross-listed for foreign 
investors, the turnover of privatized stocks in the foreign market increases without affecting 
the turnover of non-privatized stocks. It decreases the risk borne by domestic investors and 
affects to the risk premium, and finally provides better liquidity of non-privatized stocks. 
(Bortolotti et al, 2007)  
 
2.2 Privatization and stock market development 
There have been several studies that looked into the relationship between privatization and the 
stock market development. Regarding country risk, Huibers and Perotti (1998) studied whether 
the change in country risk affected the return of privatized firms after privatization compared 
to the effects on the whole market. Privatized stocks in emerging markets were exposed more 
to political risks, and showed higher post-Initial Public Offering (IPO) performance partially 
explained by the progressive alleviation of political risk after privatization (Huibers & Perotti, 
1998). Perotti and Van Oijen (2001) zoned into this relationship in terms of alleviation of the 
political risk. They compared the change in country level political risk measure of before and 
during privatization. For the measure of political risk, Perotti and Van Oijen (2001) used 
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Country Credit Rating by the Institutional Investor and International Country Risk. The 
sustained privatization resolves the country level political risk, political and legal uncertainties, 
and leads to stock market development. This finally improves investor confidence. (Perotti & 
Van Oijen, 2001) 
On the other hand, Megginson and Boutchkova (2000) studied the impact of privatization on 
the world stock and bond market. They showed that privatization programs have increased total 
proceeds and government revenue. Regarding the impact on stock market capitalization and 
trading volumes, stock market capitalization as a percentage of GDP and trading volume 
increased dramatically, and the market value of privatized firms grew. When it comes to the 
ownership structure, privatization raised the number of shareholders in SIP companies 
(Megginson & Boutchkova, 2000). 
Privatization in many countries is a good source for supply of stocks in the stock market, which 
eventually leads to stock market development. When SOEs are privatized and listed on the 
stock exchange, they increase the size of the equity market, and a strong market with a 
sufficient institutional framework is essential where market regulation is an important factor 
(Naceur, Boubakri & Ghazouani,2010). Chiesa and Nicodano (2003) identified that improved 
diversification opportunities, risk sharing opportunities, and increased participation of foreign 
investors contribute to stock market development. 
 
2.3 Privatization and performance 
In many countries, public corporations have been exposed to criticism on their inefficiency and 
corrupted management. Privatization has been a widely used policy for reform of state-owned 
economic entities. Especially in countries with strong public sectors and material fiscal deficits, 
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privatization has been encouraged to relieve unfavorable budget condition and also to improve 
performance of SOEs by reforming productivity. Thus, many preexisting studies have focused 
on the impact of privatization in performance of SOEs. In Egypt, privatization in the form of 
IPO has a strong positive impact on profitability, and operation efficiency, and shows a 
negative change in the leverage (Al Hinai, 2016). On the other hand, Jordanian enterprises 
showed improvement in liquidity and debt ratios after privatization (Al-Taani, 2013). In terms 
of the organizational culture, privatization provides better opportunities to privatized 
companies for growth. Also the reduction of conflicts between the management and the 
shareholders after privatization contributes to improved performance (Mutugi & Ngugi, 2013). 
In the empirical study on privatization in Nigeria, both the measure of profitability and  
operational efficiency improved after privatization (Usman & Olorunmolu, 2015). Also, in 
terms of cost reduction and innovation, managers in privatized companies have more incentives 
because the political interests in the firms are reduced (Otieno, 2012). 
In many countries that implemented privatization policy, most of privatization process has 
begun partially. This is the same way as in Vietnam where equitization is a partial privatization. 
According to Gupta (2005), even if state shares retains control over a company(i.e. 50% share 
after partial privatization), partial privatization still has a favorable impact on profitability, 
productivity, and investment of a partially privatized company. The monitoring function of the 
stock market contributes to improve performance (Gupta, 2005). 
However, not all studies argue that privatization has a favorable impact on firm performance. 
While a lot of studies with cases of firms in different countries show that privatization improves 
firm performances, Hagemejer, Tyrowicz, and Svejnar (2014) emphasized the importance of 
the endogeneity bias and argued that the substantial performance improvement is an unusual 
result. 
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2.4 Ownership structure and firm performance 
The impact of ownership structure on the firm performance has been a common issue in terms 
of corporate governance. Previous studies on the relationship between ownership structure and 
firm performance showed mixed results. State-ownership in enterprises may help companies 
with access to resource and information and provision of credit for loan. On the other hand, a 
majority stake of state shares in enterprises may cause political intervention, and a management 
decision process that focuses on political bias rather than profit maximization. 
In family firms, the ownership concentration in the single largest shareholder contributes to 
performance improvement, while the willingness of the largest shareholder to give the 
ownership to the professional mangers outside of the firm worsens the performance (Qin & 
Deng, 2008). Also, the impact of ownership structure varies by types of owners. In real estate 
industry in Indonesia, the ownership by the institutional investor is an significant factor that 
explains companies’ performance while managerial ownership only has partial effect on 
performance (Saleh, Zahirdin, & Octaviani, 2017) 
Some researches found that the ownership structure does not significantly influence to the firm 
performance. Demestz and Villalonga (2001) insisted that there is no statistically significant 
relationship between ownership structure and performance. A diffused ownership may lead to 
agency problems that increase unfavorable costs. However, its advantages commonly have a 
trade-off effect of negative problems (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001). Internal factors other than 
ownership concentration such as firm size, inventory had more impact on firm performance. 
Ownership concentration did not show statistically significant impact on ROA (Pathirawasam, 
2011). Even, the study of Nigerian listed companies showed that the relationship between 
ownership control and financial performance is a linear negative relation (Abosede Adebiyi & 
Kajola Sunday, 2011). In terms of right, ownership concentration negatively affects a firm 
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valuation because concentration undermines the gap between voting right and capital right 
(Chen, 2012). Phung and Mishra (2016) argued that there is a non-linear relationship between 
ownership structure and firm performance. According to their study, state ownership has a 
convex relationship with firm performance, and foreign ownership has concave relationship. 
 
2.5 Equitization as privatization 
Privatization in Vietnam has been done in the form of equitization. Equitization changes the 
equity ownership structure of enterprises. Tran, Nonneman, and Jorissen (2015) studied the 
relationship between state ownership and the company’s performance by analyzing ownership 
switching from state-owned to private-owned. According to their study, the ownership shift 
from the state or collective ownership to the private ownership can steadily improve the 
performance of firms in terms of profitability (Tran et al, 2015). However, the majority 
ownership of state provides advantages to companies. Companies with major state ownership 
showed a tendency to have more chances to borrow easily. In addition, the Vietnamese 
government has also been providing non-collateral loans for subordinated companies at lower 
cost to increase employment and to attract investment in less profitable sectors (Mishra, 2011). 
Gainsborough (2009) considered equitization in Vietnam a new form of state intervention 
rather than a complete privatization. In many cases, state-owned share in equitized SOEs 
remains high which the separation between ownership and management was not sufficiently 
achieved. Thus, investors in equitized companies still bear uncertainty. However, equitization 
as a state intervention has advantages in terms of performance because it produces incentives 
and provides capability that makes firms compete in a fierce business environment. It means 
managers in equitized SOEs tend to rely on state entities for operation. (Gainsborough, 2009). 
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3. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT 
This study seeks to identify whether the significant divestment of state-owned shares has a 
positive impact on firm’s performance defined according to profitability and financial stability. 
The research hypothesizes the following. 
• H1: The significant divestment of state-owned shares improves profitability of enterprises. 
• H2: The significant divestment of state-owned shares improves financial stability of 
enterprises. 
 
4. METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1 Target Company Selection 
Most of previous researches that studied privatization of SOEs in Vietnam considered 
equitization as privatization. However, in this paper, for the purpose of analyzing the 
substantive effect of decline in state-owned shares on firm performance, only companies that 
experienced significant divestment of state-owned shares were selected. The significant 
divestment is defined in the typology specified in the table below.  
Table 7. Classification of significant divestment 
Type Rationale Change of state share 
Type 1 Lose Control >50% to >= 50% 
Type 2 Lose Significant Influence >20% to >= 20% 
Type 3 Significant Change in Share% More than 20% 
 
Type 1 refers to cases where state-owned share has changed from over 50% to below 50%. 
Generally, 50% of share is a reference point for determining whether a shareholder has control 
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over a company. It is described in International Financial Reporting Standards 10 (IFRS 10), 
as written “In the most straightforward case, the investor that holds a majority of those voting 
rights, in the absence of any other factors, controls the investee.” (IFRS foundation, 2018). If 
a state entity holds more than 50% of shares, it can make business related decisions of an 
invested company the through exercise of its voting rights. In addition, since the board of 
directors is usually appointed at the general meeting of shareholders, a state entity with a stake 
greater than 50% can control a major part of the management of the invested company. Thus, 
if state-owned share has changed from over 50% to below 50%, it is regarded as a significant 
divestment. 
Type 2 means the cases that state-owned shares over the company declined from over 20% to 
less than 20%. Typically, 20% of share is a criteria to determine whether a shareholder has an 
ability to significantly influence a company’s decision-making activities. According to 
International Accounting Standard 28 (IAS 28), significant influence means “the power to 
participate in the financial and operating policy decisions of the investee but is not control” 
(IFRS foundation, 2018). In addition, in IAS 28, it is also described that “If an entity holds, 
directly or indirectly, 20% or more of the voting power of the investee, it is presumed that the 
entity has significant influence, unless it can be clearly demonstrated that this is not the case.” 
(IFRS foundation, 2018). Thus, cases that state-owned shares over the company declined from 
over 20% to less than 20% are also considered significant divestment. 
Type 3 refers when the state ownership is significantly reduced even if it does not fall into the 
above two categories. In this paper, I set 20% of change as a reference point to determine 
whether a decrease in state share is a significant of divestment or not.  
Similar to other countries, private companies in Vietnam do not provide sufficient financial 
data and ownership information which are essentially required for this study. Publicly disclosed 
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information of public companies which are listed on Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) and 
Hochiminh Stock Exchange (HOSE) were used in this paper. And as of the end of June in 2018, 
a total 740 firms were listed in the Vietnamese stock market, 379 in HNX and 361 in HOSE. 
In this study, ownership structure of all 740 listed companies were reviewed. 
As a result of the selection by the above criteria, a total of 58 companies whose state-owned 
shares decreased significantly between 2001 and 2016 were the ones selected. The information 
from their annual reports, audited financial statement, and Vietstock.com were used to identify 
the ownership structure of each individual firm. All companies without sufficient disclosed 
information in terms of the ownership structure were excluded from the target selection. 
 
4.2 Measure of Performance 
The ratios in the Table 8 were used to measure the profitability and financial stability of the 
target companies. For the measures for profitability, Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Asset 
(ROA), Operating Profit Margin (OP%), Net Profit Margin (NP%) were used. Meanwhile, 
Debt to Equity Ratio was used to measure the companies’ financial stability. In this research, 
three years average value of each measure before and after divestment were applied to capture 
the volatility of each year. 
Table 8. Measure of performance 
 
Measure Formula Nature 
Return on Equity (ROE) NI / Total Equity Profitability 
Return on Asset (ROA) EBIT / Total Asset Profitability 
Operating Profit Margin (OP%) EBIT / Revenue Profitability 
Net Profit Margin (NP%) NI / Revenue Profitability 
Debt to Equity Ratio (D/E) Total Debt / Total Equity Financial Stability 
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4.3 Comparison 
I calculated the average value of the measures for each company for a period of three years 
prior to and three years after the divestment. However, the calculated value also covered the 
effect of market economic condition aside from the impact of divestment. To eliminate the 
effect from the market economic condition, I followed the steps below: 
Table 9. Steps to identify the change after divestment  
 
Steps Procedure 
Step 1. 
Calculated the average value of each measure for all 58 target companies for 
a three-year period before and after divestment 
Step 2. 
Calculated the annual average value of each measure from the year 2001 to 
2017 for all 740 listed companies. 
Step 3. 
The following values were calculated as for each measure of each target 
company: 
 
1. Difference before divestment (Dif.bd) 
= [Three-year average before divestment from Step 1] – [Three-year 
average of annual average value from Step 2 before divestment year for a 
target company] 
 
2. Difference after divestment (Dif.ad) 
= [Three-year average after divestment from Step 1] – [Three-year 
average of annual average value from Step 2 after divestment year for a 
target company] 
 
 
If Dif.bd or Dif.ad is positive number, the target company relatively 
outperformed the market. But if Dif.bd or Dif.ad is negative number, the 
company relatively underperformed the market. 
 
Step 4.  
The Dif.bd and Dif.ad of each company was compared and the change 
between the two values was also calculated. The same procedure was done on 
the average value of Dif.bd and Dif.ad for each measure of all sample 
companies.    
The two year average value were applied to the companies that do not have sufficient 
observation period after divestment. All companies who experienced divestment after 2016 
were excluded from the observation. 
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Table 10. Annual average market data by year 
Measure 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
ROE 18.6% 18.8% 21.3% 22.2% 21.2% 17.3% 13.4% 19.0% 
ROA 9.9% 9.3% 9.7% 8.7% 9.2% 8.6% 7.2% 9.7% 
OP% 27.5% 23.8% 19.6% 12.9% 13.8% 12.6% 14.5% 17.9% 
NP% 15.1% 13.8% 13.9% 10.5% 11.7% 9.5% 17.3% 15.9% 
D/E 5.0 4.0 3.2 3.5 3.0 2.1 2.2 2.0 
Average of previous 3 years             
ROE  18.9% 19.6% 20.8% 21.6% 20.3% 17.3% 16.6% 
ROA  9.3% 9.7% 9.2% 9.2% 8.8% 8.3% 8.5% 
OP%  27.0% 23.7% 18.8% 15.4% 13.1% 13.6% 15.0% 
NP%  17.4% 14.3% 12.7% 12.0% 10.6% 12.8% 14.2% 
D/E   4.8 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 2.4 2.1 
         
Measure 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 
ROE 17.1% 12.3% 8.3% 8.6% 9.3% 11.1% 8.9% 8.0% 
ROA 9.4% 7.0% 5.9% 5.9% 6.2% 6.9% 6.4% 5.9% 
OP% 17.7% 8.3% (1.1%) (3.3%) (5.5%) 3.4% 1.4% (4.1%) 
NP% 15.2% 6.9% (2.2%) (6.8%) (4.2%) 2.2% 7.3% (7.4%) 
D/E 1.9 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 
Average of previous 3 years             
ROE 16.5% 16.1% 12.6% 9.7% 8.7% 9.7% 9.8% 9.4% 
ROA 8.8% 8.7% 7.4% 6.2% 6.0% 6.3% 6.5% 6.4% 
OP% 16.7% 14.6% 8.3% 1.3% (3.3%) (1.8%) (0.2%) 0.2% 
NP% 16.1% 12.6% 6.6% (0.7%) (4.4%) (2.9%) 1.8% 0.7% 
D/E 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.8 
 
Source: Annual reports, audited financial statements, and Vietstock.com 
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5. DATA ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Data 
Comparison of the Dif.bd and Dif.ad of each companies rendered the following results. 
Table 11. Value of measure before and after divestment 
 
Measure 
Target Average Market Average Difference 
Before After Before After Before After Change 
ROE 11.55% 11.71% 12.02% 10.27% -0.46% 1.45% 1.91% 
ROA 6.08% 6.88% 7.07% 6.66% -0.99% 0.23% 1.21% 
OP% 8.51% 7.67% 3.98% 2.04% 4.53% 5.63% 1.10% 
NP% 7.58% 6.81% 3.10% 1.85% 4.49% 4.96% 0.47% 
D/E 1.68 1.65 1.98 1.86 (0.29) (0.21) 0.08  
 
All measures of profitability showed favorable changes after divestment. In case of ROE, the 
average ROE of target companies changed from 11.55% to 11.71% after divestment. Contrary 
to this, the market average ROE changed from 12.02% to 10.27%. The difference improved 
from -0.46% before divestment to 1.45% after divestment. This shows that the divestment of 
state-owned share improved the ROE of divested firms. The ROA showed similar findings. 
The average ROA of targets improved for 0.8%, from 6.08% to 6.88% while the market 
average was declined from 7.07% to 6.66%. The difference changed from -0.99% to 0.23% 
which means that the divested companies showed improved ROA after divestment.  
OP% also improved with the average OP% of the target companies decreasing from 8.51% to 
7.67%. However, the market average declined more significantly. Thus, the difference 
improved by 1.1%, from 4.53% before divestment to 5.63% after divestment. 
OP% showed similar change with OP%. The average OP% of target companies declined for -
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0.78%, but the change in market average was more significant, -1.25%. As a result, the 
difference increased for 0.47% after divestment. 
Contrary to the result described earlier, the debt to equity ratio appeared to have worsened. 
Debt to equity ratio is the measure for financial stability, appeared to be worsened. The average 
debt to equity ratio of target companies before divestment was at 1.68. It decreased to 1.65 
after divestment. However, the market average debt to equity ratio decreased more 
significantly, from 1.98 to 1.86. Thus, the difference increased from -0.29 to -0.21 which means 
deterioration. 
Overall, based on the data from 58 target companies and 740 listed companies, it seems that 
divestment has positive impacts on profitability because ROE, ROA, OP%, and OP% were 
improved after the divestment of state-owned shares. Findings also show that divestment has 
negative impacts on financial stability as apparent in the change in debt to equity ratio.  
 
5.2 T-Test 
To identify the recorded changes are statistically significant, I applied statistical. A left-tailed 
test was applied since the interest of this study is on the higher performance after divestment. 
Table 12. Test Information 
Test Type Independent Samples T-Test 
Hypothesis 
H0: μ1=μ2 
Means of the difference are equal before and after divestment 
Ha: μ1<μ2 
Means of the difference after divestment are larger than the difference before 
divestment 
Level of 
Significance 
5% (0.05) 
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According to the Table 13, there is no statistically significant improvement in ROE after 
divestment. The P-value for one-tailed test is 0.167127 which is larger than 5%. Thus, the 
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, implying that ROE does not increase after divestment. 
ROA shows similar result. The P-value of it is 0.198833 which leads not to reject the null 
hypothesis. In the test of OP% and NP%, P-values of them are less than 5%, 0.366124 and 
0.430717 for each measure. P-values for one-tailed test in all four measure for profitability 
are smaller than 5%. As a result, in this test, I failed to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, the 
significant divestment of state-owned shares does not positively improve profitability of 
divested enterprises. 
The result for financial stability is similar. The P-value of one tailed test for debt to equity 
ratio is 0.414445 as described in Table1 13. Since the P-value of the test is smaller than the 
level of significance, I failed to reject the null hypothesis. Thus, the significant divestment of 
state-owned shares does not positively improve financial stability of divested enterprises.
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Table 13. Test Result 
 ROE ROA OP% NI% Debt to Equity 
  Dif.bd Dif.ad Dif.bd Dif.ad Dif.bd Dif.ad Dif.bd Dif.ad Dif.bd Dif.ad 
Mean -0.00462 0.014462 -0.00988 0.002264 0.045284 0.056299 0.044869 0.049592 -0.29218 -0.20903 
Variance 0.011355 0.011498 0.005706 0.006364 0.031602 0.029259 0.01682 0.026188 3.833427 4.86099 
Observations 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 59 
Pooled Variance 0.011427   0.006035   0.03043   0.021504   4.347209   
Hypothesized Mean 
Difference 0   0   0   0   0   
df 116   116   116   116   116   
t Stat -0.96962   -0.84894   -0.34296   -0.17494   -0.21661   
P(T<=t) one-tail 0.167127   0.198833   0.366124   0.430717   0.414445   
t Critical one-tail 1.658096   1.658096   1.658096   1.658096   1.658096   
P(T<=t) two-tail 0.334253   0.397665   0.732248   0.861435   0.82889   
t Critical two-tail 1.980626   1.980626   1.980626   1.980626   1.980626   
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6. CONCLUSION 
 
Discussion 
This paper examined how divestment of state-owned shares in Vietnamese listed companies 
affects their performance. The Vietnamese government has pursued privatization of SOEs 
through equitization since 1992. However, as equitization is done through partial privatization, 
state-owned shares are still high in most of equitized SOEs. Thus, divestment of state 
ownership is still in progress which leads to genuine privatization. Thus, this study examines 
not only the relationship between equitization and performance but also the effect of the decline 
of state ownership on the performance of enterprises. Performance is classified into two 
detailed parts, profitability and financial stability. The firm’s profitability was measured 
through Return on Equity (ROE), Return on Asset (ROA), Operating Profit Margin (OP%), 
Net Profit Margin (NP%) while financial stability was measured by debt to equity ratio.  
For the research, I reviewed the ownership structure change of 740 listed companies on HNX 
and HOSE. Out of the listed companies, 58 companies experienced significant divestment of 
state-owned shares. To identify the effects of divestment, I calculated the relative performance 
of 58 selected companies in the relation to the market average before and after the divestment, 
and analyzed the changes in the values of the indicators after divestment. The findings show 
that the significant divestment of state-owned shares improves profitability and worsens 
financial stability. However, T-Test results show that the changes before and after divestment 
are not statistically significant. Therefore, the divestment of state-owned shares in enterprises 
does not significantly improve their performance. 
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Limitation of the Study and Future Research 
In this research, financial information and ownership structure of listed companies were used 
because of the lack of publicly disclosed information on non-listed firms. In other words, only 
740 listed companies and 58 selected target companies are examined. However, most SOEs 
are non- listed firms.  
Also, this study relies on annual reports, audited financial statements, and data from the 
Vietstock website for all financial information and ownership structure of the companies. It 
may be necessary to verify the reliability and completeness of the disclosed information. In the 
case of Vietnamese companies, there are cases in which insufficient information are provided 
even in listed companies. In addition, I did not perform any additional verification of the 
accuracy of accounting information in the disclosed information. 
Business and the firm’s internal factors such as industry, company size, and the number of 
employees were not considered in this paper. Each industry has different business features, and 
business and firm internal factors can also be variables that affect performance. Also, the 
degree of influence of the divestment may be different depending on those factors. This study 
examines 58 selected companies collectively considering the small size of selected target 
companies. However, if it is possible to collect sufficient information from private companies, 
it would be necessary to analyze and consider these other factors. 
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